The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 Developed by Zain Sheikh

(a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 Article 203

it will also not be out of place to mention that the CESAT established under the statue would not be immune from the superintendence of this Court under Article 203 of the 1973 Constitution which empowers the High Court to supervise and control all courts subordinate to it.

In this manner, there can be little doubt that the CESAT, at least for the purposes of Article 203 of the Constitution is a Court in which case the powers of its superintendence and control vests with the High Court. In coming to such conclusion were are also fortified from the fact that the appeals against the orders and judgments of the CESAT, under relevant statues, lie with the High Court. Thus, applying the verdicts in Khadija Bibi v. Abdul Wahid and Iftikhar Ahmed v. MCB (cited supra) there is every reason to hold that CESAT would fall within the superintendence and control of the High Court under Article 203 of the Constitution, in which it is territorially situated. [pp. 2734 & 2738] K & Q

(b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 Article 203

For the purposes of Article 203 there is no reason to give the term “Courts” appearing therein any narrow or pedantic meaning so as to exclude judicial or quasi-judicial forums or administrative tribunals from its purview. [p. 2737]O

(c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 Articles 175, 203 & 212

In matters of taxation alongwith others there is no reason why the concept of separation of powers should not be applied. It would not be out of place here to place reliance on Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 16, at page 503 wherein the principle of separation of powers has been approved to be extended to matters of taxation.

If the principle of separation of powers as enshrined in our Constitution is made applicable to matters of taxation, then at least the hierarchies of the judicial forums culminating in the Appellate Tribunals should function under the umbrella of the judicature. If this is so then various provisions in the taxing statures providing for appointments of members to the Appellate Tribunals by the Central Government would fall foul of the Constitution.

If the appointments to the Appellate Tribunals are also regulated and supervised by the judicial organ, it would also be in keeping with Article 203 of the Constitution as already discussed above. In these circumstances the Federal Government may consider and devise schemes or amendments whereby-

(a) All existing appointments of members in all the Appellate Tribunals created under Article 212 are placed before the Chief Justice of the Province in which the incumbents are performing their duties. The Chief Justice himself or any other Judge authorized by or committee appointed by him may look into such appointments to approve or disapprove the same, which would be binding upon the Federal Government;

(b) All future appointments would be screened by the judicial organ of the State.
Appointing members to these Tribunals on political basis or who are otherwise incompetent or have doubtful integrity would prove completely counter-productive, since firstly the quality of judgments as intended o aspired cannot be delivered and secondly, aggrieved against the actions and inactions of the Appellate Tribunals a flood-gate of litigation could be experienced by the High Courts as is marked by the recent trend. [pp. 2740, 2741]S, T, U & V